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1 
Massimo Durante, Turin/Italy*  
 
E-democracy as the Frame of Networked Public Discourse  
Information, Consensus and Complexity 
 
Abstract: The quest for democracy and the political reflection about its future are to be understood 
nowadays in the horizon of the networked information revolution. Hence, it seems difficult to speak of 
democracy without speaking of e-democracy, the key issue of which is the re-configuration of models 
of information production and concentration of attention, which are to be investigated both from a 
political and an epistemological standpoint. In this perspective, our paper aims at analyzing the multi-
agent dimension of networked public discourse, by envisaging two competing models of structuring 
this discourse (those of dialogue and of claim) and by suggesting to endorse the epistemic idea of 
complementarity as a guidance principle for elaborating a form of partnership between traditional 
and electronic media. 
Keywords: democracy, information, public discourse, public sphere, complexity, complementarity  
  
I. Democracy, complexity and space 
Today,  democracy  has  to  be  rethought  against  the  backdrop  of  the  evolution  of  the 
communication and information technologies (ICTs) in terms of an electronic democracy (e-
democracy) that grows out of the complex networked society of information.
1 Out of several 
legitimate and important meanings of e -democracy (e-government; e-voting, etc.), I believe 
that e-democracy is strongly concerned with how ICTs redesign the public sphere, conceived 
as a category of space, in which political-public discourse and public opinion are produced on 
the basis of available relevant and reliable information. In this perspective, we will have three 
key concepts to deal with, namely, those of complexity, information and space. These issues 
define the conceptual perimeter of our study.    
The complex networked society is defined by the fact that, in such a society, “inhabiting” 
(i.e. living in a space that defines the place of our identity and citizenship) is progressively 
being substituted by “being connected”.  In this sense, what is conceptually at stake is to 
understand and to articulate the passage from a merely physical conception of space to a 
networked conception of space made of informational flows and relations. The physical space 
                                                           
* Researcher in Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, Turin University, Italy.  
1 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. I-
III, Blackwell, Oxford 1996-98; Marc Taylor, The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 2001; Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom, Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2006; Luciano Floridi, Information. A Very Short 
Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.   
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is conceived starting from the relations and the properties of objects, whereas the digital space 
is conceived starting from the relations and the properties of digital objects that are made of 
bits
2 and the space of information is thought of starting from the relations and the properties 
of informational objects, that is, objects that can be described in terms of information at the 
proper  level  of  abstraction
3  or  can  accomplish  four  elementary  operations:  receiving, 
producing, storing and treating information.
4 In the complex networked society of information 
subjects are subjects of relations that establish, along the informational fluxes, throu ghout 
their networked connections and interactions. The complexity of society is expressed by the 
fact  that  the  outcome  of  interconnected  subjects’  interactions  is  not  foreseeable  in 
deterministic terms
5.  
This last consideration requires us to endorse a n on-deterministic conception of the 
impact technology displays in society. To endorse a non -deterministic conception from a 
socio-technological point of view does not amount however to lessening the importance of 
such  an  impact.  On  the  contrary,  technology  is  understood  as  a  set  of  constraining 
affordances
6, that is, a set of both constraints and affordances (technologies that bring along 
constraints as well as possibilities) that gives shape to the environment in which we are 
engaged, namely, in which we are called upon to decide, act and interact. Our deci sions and 
behaviours  can  thus  be  interpreted  as  responses  –  active  and  creative,  and  thus  not-
deterministically biased – to the constraining affordances that shape our own environment 
(this approach conceived in terms of constraining affordances and active responses defeats 
both  techno-determinism  and  cyber-optimism).  This  way  of  understanding  technology  is 
particularly consistent with the conception of epistemology we endorse, as we will make it 
clear in the next paragraph. 
The technological constraining affordances relative to information and communication 
give shape to the democratic space where we are engaged in forming not only our opinions 
and beliefs (that our political decisions and actions are meant to be based on) but, first and 
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foremost, our own political subjectivity. In relation to the evolution of technology and notably 
to the evolution of ICTs, the question is to rethink how the technological constraints and 
affordances redesign the space in which the political subjectivities and the public opinion are 
formed.  
This already implies implicitly, that the publicness of the digital space of information and 
communication  cannot  be  intended,  according  to  the  reflection  of  Jürgen  Habermas  for 
instance, exclusively as the place where relevant information is gathered and selected, public 
opinions are formed and expressed, and rational arguments guiding collective decisions are 
proposed and, reflexively, criticized and refined. In the backdrop of the complex networked 
society of information, the publicness of the digital space of information and communication 
is also the dimension in which new actors (notably emerging from civil society) can engage in 
mutual communication, merge their desires and democratic expectations and, thereby, claim 
to be recognized as political subjects.
7  
Our hypothesis consists at saying that the evolution of ICTs is democratic in that it 
enlarges the class of what counts as relevant political information, whilst broadening as well 
the class of those who count as political subjects . However, this enlargement can have 
consequences not only from a political point of view but first and foremost from an 
epistemological point of view concerned with the construction of meaning by means of the 
political public discourse. As we will see in the third paragraph, the political public discourse 
may be structured according to different models of communication, those of “dialogue” and 
of “claim”, meant to influence the crucial issue of the quality of information in e-democracy. 
At  present,  we  have  to  insist  upon  the  last  topic,  that  is,  the  relation  between  e-
democracy, politics and the complex society. As remarked above, the evolution of ICTs has 
characterized the complex society in terms of a networked society of information in which 
space is no longer conceived solely as a place to live in and to occupy (with all the political 
and legal metaphors and concepts that go along with such representation of space). Rather, 
space is conceived as a place where we are connected and we interact with one another and 
with the environment. We have to add to this picture that the current information revolution 
shapes these connections and interactions out of a rigid anthropocentric perspective and this 
happens in two different ways.  
On the one hand, it is possible to conceive, according to the philosophy of information of 
Luciano Floridi, the space of information as an “infosphere”
8, a neologism that was coined 
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after the idea of biosphere meaning that the whole environment is made up by informational 
objects  and  by  their  relations.  According  to  this  idea,  every  entity  can  be  described  and 
experienced  by  an  epistemic  agent  at  the  informational  level  of  abstraction  as  a  set  of 
information.  The  informational  representation  of  being  proposed  by  Luciano  Floridi  has 
important and direct consequences for an epistemology and an ethics of information as well as 
influence over a political and legal philosophy
9: the first and most striking consequence of 
such an approach consists in abandoning a philosophically and morally r igid anthropocentric 
perspective by treating human beings as informational objects as all the other entities of the 
universe. The second consequence affects more directly the present topic and it consists in 
saying that the space of information conceived i n terms of the infosphere includes both the 
analogue and the digital space: this means that we are confronted with the need to account 
epistemologically for an integrated space of information and communication.  
On the other hand, according to a pancomputationalist theory of information that has 
been recently investigated in philosophical terms by Michel Serres
10, it is possible to overlook 
the  dichotomy  subject/object,  that  grounds  our  entire  epistemological  and  moral 
representation of the universe in moder n times, since every entity is no longer conceived 
either as a subject or as an object but, rather, as an informational system capable of 
accomplishing four basic operations, i.e. to receive, produce, store and treat information. In 
both these perspectives, space is understood on the basis of the properties and the relations of 
objects conceived as interconnected entities that interact thanks to their capacity to constantly 
exchange and share information going beyond a rigid anthropocentric perspective.  
This new conception of space is likely to modify, in the long run (even if this process 
already seems to have started), the very conception of politics, in which the idea of space was 
fundamental in the modern age. Throughout modernity, space has been the ve ry horizon of 
the constitution of politics as the condition of human coexistence: this condition has been 
conceived by political power in terms of control over a territory. The current evolution of 
ICTs is likely to alter this conception of politics: some  processes, like that of globalization or 
the crossing of political, legal, and cultural boundaries
11, are already at work. In the long run, 
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politics will no longer be conceived in terms of control over a territory but, rather, as the 
management  over  the  whole  life-cycle  of  information  (creation,  elaboration,  distribution, 
storage, protection, usage and possible destruction of information
12), since information will 
constitute both the basic good exchanged and the very fabric of reality. This brings about two 
main consequences.  
The first one has been well captured by Jannis Kallinikos, stating that the current 
computational rendition of reality has “far-reaching implications in the sense of recapturing a 
growing proportion of the physical and cognitive landscape of contemporary life into the 
medium  of  permutable  and  recombinable  information”
13.  This  challenges  our  tendency  to 
think  about  reality  in  terms  of  stable  and  enduring  structures  and  institutions
14.  This 
consideration will be illustrated in the fourth paragraph when dealing with the phenomenon of 
virtualization of content that is an emergent property of democracies based on media power.   
The second consequence has been well expressed by Manuel Castells, stating that 
contemporary construction of politics occurs through media power
15. The communication (the 
mainstream political-public discourse) through which are selected, formed, and legitimized 
the “ends of politics” is structured within the life-cycle of information. In this perspective, e-
democracy  is  called  upon  to  be  the  “frame”  of  the  mainstream  political-public  discourse 
through which politics form, select and legitimate its ends. This implies, as pointed out by 
Jürgen Habermas
16, that democracy may have an epistemic foundation as far as the formation 
of the political-public discourse, through which meaning and consensus are constructed, can 
be subjected to criticism. This requires us to focus on what epistemology and models of 
communication ground political-public discourse in the renewed public sphe re made up by 
the interplay between traditional and electronic media.  
In  this  perspective,  the  “e-democratic  frame”  is  a  matter  of  information  and 
communication. In fact, information is the basis on which beliefs are formed and decisions are 
taken: in this sense, information is a primary instrument for governing. As it has been pointed 
out
17, the governance of society is no longer centered upon hard power (i.e. military force, 
means of coercion, sanctions, etc.) but, rather, upon soft power (i.e. the abilit y to influence 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Abingdon, Routledge Cavendish, 2007; CEPE, Crossing Boundaries. Ethics in Interdisciplinary and Intercultural 
Relations, Proceedings of CEPE 2011 (edited by J. Mauger), INSEIT publications, 2011.     
12 Luciano Floridi, A Look into the Future Impact of ICT on Our Lives, The Information Society, (2007) 23.1, 
59-64. 
13 Kallinikos (note 2) at 6. 
14 See again Kallinikos (note 2).  
15 Manuel Castells, Communication Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, Il ruolo dell’intellettuale e la causa dell’Europa, translated by C. Mainoldi, Laterza, Roma-
Bari (Ach, Europa. Kleine Politische Schriften XI, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008), 2011.  
17 Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard, and Smart, Oxford University Press, US, 2008.  
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behavior through the construction of meaning on the basis of discourses through which social 
actors guide their action
18). 
Five  main  features  characterize  the  construction  of  meaning  accomplished  in  the 
political-public discourse in the complex networked society of information:  
 
1) the construction of meaning is distributed, namely, it is accomplished by a multiplicity 
of  interconnected  actors  throughout  networks  that  can  be  represented  as  radically 
distributed or as moderately decentralized
19; 
2) the role of each actor in the construction of meaning depends on the role that each 
actor plays as the node of a network and on the attitude of that network to collaborate or 
to compete with other networks; 
3) the  construction  of  meaning  depends,  more  generally,  on  the  properties  of  the 
information  exchanged  and  shared  throughout  the  networks  (which  define  the 
epistemological  constraining  affordance  as  informational  resources
20)  and  on  the 
properties of the architecture of networks (which define the structural c onstraining 
affordances as they give shape to the environment in which social and political actors are 
engaged); 
4) the construction of meaning provides political power with its legitimization as far as it 
raises consensus on (a) the “ends” and (b) the “scale” of the political action;  
5) in  a  complex  networked  society  of  information  consensus  is  cognitively  based  on 
perceived trust more than on experienced trust: this means that, in media democracy, it is 
not only a question of relational trust, expressed with regards to specific political actors, 
but it is matter of systemic trust, expressed in relation to the system those actors are part 
of.  
 
The last point is crucial, since consensus is not mainly formulated and manifested by means 
of “real” attribution of trust directed towards specific political actors. On the contrary, it is 
formulated and manifested by means of a “virtual” attribution of trust, which is indirectly 
expressed in relation to some constituent issues of the system that these actors are part of. 
Direct  and  real  consensus  is  substituted  or,  at  least,  prepared  by  indirect  and  virtual 
allegiance. This aspect becomes one of the central features of media power that deserves 
                                                           
18 Castells (note 15). 
19 See, on this point, Alexander Galloway,  Protocol. How Control Exists After Decentralization, MIT Press, 
Cambridge  Mass,  2004;  Alexander  Galloway  &  Eugene  Thacker,   The  Exploit.  A  Theory  of  Networks, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2007; Benkler (note 1).  
20 See Floridi (note 6) at 77.  
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special  attention,  because  the  place  of  (legitimization  of)  power  (through  the  fiduciary 
construction of consensus) is then rather “virtual” than empty: we are thus confronted with a 
phenomenon that we could define in terms of a “virtualization of consensus”. This virtual 
consensus, allegiance or commitment, is indirectly manifested, as we will see in the third 
paragraph, towards what is meant to be put “at risk” in the system: this explains why “risks” 
are fabricated by traditional media and “fear” has become the key issue of the political-public 
discourse. 
We will come back to this point. At present, we should focus our attention on the claim 
that democracy has an epistemic foundation. This requires us, first, to endorse a conception of 
epistemology  that  would  be  consistent  with  the  technological  evolution  of  ICTs  and, 
secondly, to envisage, on this epistemological basis, what the models of communication are 
according to which political-public discourse is meant to be structured out of the interplay 
between traditional and electronic media. 
 
II. Constraints and affordances: the epistemological principle of complementarity  
We have been speaking so far of “constraints” and “affordances” in technical terms: we have 
now to elucidate these concepts from an epistemological point of view, in order to introduce 
the principle of complementarity as the epistemic backdrop of e-democracy. In order to do so, 
we will take advantage of Mauro Ceruti’s
21 epistemological reflections on these points.  
To start with, we have to remark that the process of “decentralization” that has been 
brought  about  by  the  technological  architecture  of  the  net  and,  more  generally,  by  the 
complexity of networks – which has facilitated users’ access to information and participation 
in the generation of content – has also been underlined and explained in epistemological 
terms. As Ceruti puts it
22: 
 
Contemporary epistemological reflection instead refers the concept of decentralization to two equally 
fundamental facts: the proliferation of the real in objects, levels, spheres of reality, and the awareness 
that such proliferation is always translated in the language and in the communication of an observer 
[our transl.].           
 
This process of decentralization has been stressed also by Luciano Floridi
23 and formulated in 
informational  terms,  through  a  cluster  of  concepts  (i.e.  proliferation  or  flourishing  of 
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informational objects, the levels of abstraction, the semantic role of the informee, etc.), which 
we cannot  develop  in  the present  context.  It  suffices  to  notice that, according to  Floridi, 
decentralization  endorses  an  universalistic  approach  based  on  the  notion  of  informational 
object: namely, any entity can be described and experienced by an epistemic agent as a sum of 
well-formed information. Let us come back to our main question. 
The process  of “decentralization of  the image of  the cosmos” comes together and is 
coupled with an analogue process of “decentralization of our ways of thinking that cosmos”
24. 
Such processes (i.e. the role of the observer and a new interpretation of the laws of nature) 
have brought about an epistemological switch from a “science of necessity” to a “science of 
game”
25: 
 
To talk of game, in order to describe the evolutionary and historical processes of social and natural 
systems, is to hint to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms guiding the history of nature. […] 
Evolutionary processes always depend upon insoluble interaction among general mechanisms which 
operate as constraints – “laws” – and the variety, the individuality, the spatial-temporal singularity of 
the events. Nature and history all the time play interesting games: i.e. games that do not necessarily 
have a winning strategy elaborated from the start. The course of the game always occurs within and 
though the interaction between rules posed as constraints and as constituents of the game, chance, and 
the contingency of particular events and of particular choices, and the strategies of the players in 
utilizing the rules and chance so as to construct new scenarios and new possibilities [our transl.].
26 
 
Constraints limit the sphere of possibilities not in the sense of being a cause of a determined, 
necessary effect, but, rather, in the sense that, by delimiting the sphere of possibilities, they 
afford new opportunities. This point has been accurately articulated by Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers:  
 
A constraint […] does not merely delimit the possibilities; it is also opportunity. It is not simply 
imposed  from  the  outside  onto  a  pre-existing  reality,  but  participates  in  the  construction  of  an 
integrated  structure  and  determines  in  the  light  of  a  particular  occasion  an  entire  spectrum  of 
intelligible new consequences.
 27  
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25 Ceruti (note 21) at 10.  
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9 
From this outlook, we are allowed to say that our understanding of technologies in terms of 
constraining affordances is consistent with the epistemological construction of the notions of 
constraints  and  affordances  (or  possibilities  or  opportunities)  suggested  by  Ceruti
28  citing 
Prigogine and Stengers (as  well as it is consistent with the semantic interpretation of 
informational resources in terms of constraining affordances formulated by Luciano Floridi
29).  
The idea of science as a “game” is thus based on the abandon of the image of science as 
an  asymptotic  process  of  approximation  towards  a  unique  and  fundamental  place  of 
observation  and  explanation.  On  the  contrary,  the  game  consists  precisely  in  the 
reintroduction  of  the  observer  within  the  system  of  observation  and  explanation.
30  The 
categorical universe of science ceases to appear as something unitary, homogeneous and fixed 
once for all; on the contrary, it appears as characterized by an irreducible plurality of 
observers’ viewpoints. This brings about a main epistemological consequence that is decisive 
for the purpose of our paper and the correct understanding of the epistemic foundation of e-
democracy: 
 
The irreducibility of the observers’ points of view hic et nunc, their presence in every description, in 
every strategy, indeed, in every matter of heuristics, sparks off an image of the development and 
structure  of  knowledge  according  to  which  the  possible  universes  of  discourse  are  never defined 
exhaustively, but are constructed and depend on the network of concrete relations of antagonism, 
complementarity and cooperation between the multiple viewpoints at play [our transl.].
31       
 
What does it imply? This epistemological approach not only endorses a necessary pluralism 
of  observers’  viewpoints  but  it  asserts  that  the  epistemic  question  is  no  longer  that  of 
reconciling different points of view; rather, the question is to understand how different points 
of view produce themselves reciprocally
32: 
   
The real reversal in perspective consists in the recognition of the irreducibility of the points of view or, 
what is more, in the recognition of their proliferation in different directions and at different levels. 
There is a plurality of points of view belonging to concrete subjects like those adopting different 
systems of categorical references to judge the same evidence. There is also a plurality of points of 
                                                           
28 Ceruti (note 21) at 40. 
29 Floridi (note 6).  
30 Ceruti (note 21) at 39-40. 
31 Ceruti (note 21) at 43. 
32 Ceruti (note 21) at 44.  
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view within the same subject endorsing, with regard to some problems and ends, different systems of 
categorical references, logics and forms of thinking [our transl.].
33     
 
This understanding of knowledge is thus no longer characterized by the need to establish a 
synthesis between these different viewpoints (that can overrule some points of view in favor 
of some others). On the contrary, it is characterized by the image of antagonism, cooperation 
and complementarity between different systems of categorical references: in this perspective, 
the epistemic attention is rather focused on the conceptual matrices that make these systems 
or viewpoints antagonist, concurrent or cooperative. According to this approach, the unity of 
knowledge is not expressed by synthesis but, rather, by complementarity and epistemology 
can be said to be inspired by a principle of complementarity that is an “essential precondition 
for every epistemological inquiry”.
34   
Different points of view as well as different forms of discourse should not be conceived 
as mutually alternative but rather as antagonist, concurrent or cooperative, according to the 
differences between conceptual matrices that make them differ from one another. Each one 
can  participate  in  the  construction  of  knowledge  within  the  constraining  affordances  that 
characterize their respective conceptual matrix: this perspective requires us to move from a 
conception of epistemology based on representation to a conception of epistemology based 
on construction.
35  
This brings about a profound consequence that is decisive for us. The irreducible 
pluralism of viewpoints displayed by the principle of complementarity does not only imply 
that antagonist or cooperative discourses concur in the construction of knowledge according 
to the interplay between their conceptual matrices (the set of their constraining affordances): it 
implies more. Precisely, it implies that the whole cognitive universe is constituted as a 
polisystemic subject
36 that appears to be the sphere of antagonism and cooperation between 
systems that are characterized by different logics, hierarchies, subjects and viewpoints: 
 
This image of the subject as being composed by multiple systems constitutes a mode of thought which 
decisively orients many of the most interesting contemporary studies into the nature of the subject at 
whatever level they are placed [our transl.].
37         
  
                                                           
33 Ceruti (note 21) at 96. 
34 Ceruti (note 21) at 97-98.  
35 Ceruti (note 21) at 103. 
36 Ceruti (note 21) at 111. 
37 Ceruti (note 21) at 111.  
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Such an epistemological perspective is therefore crucial in order to account for what we could 
call  as  the  subject  or  the  system  of  communication  in  our  e-democracies.  In  fact,  it  is 
important  to  conceive  the  epistemic  foundation  of  e-democracy  on  the  basis  of  the 
requirements displayed by the principle of complementarity, according to which the subject or 
the system of communication may be understood as an ‘integrated public sphere’ where do 
occur antagonism and cooperation between systems that are characterized by different logics, 
hierarchies, subjects and viewpoints. This requires that different models of communication 
(i.e. models that are formed on the basis of different conceptual matrices) can compete or 
cooperate not only in (a) the construction of an heterogeneous basis of information, but also in 
(b) the process of subjectivation. 
In other words, differences between outlets of communication should be traced back to 
differences  between  conceptual  matrices  (i.e.  sets  of  constraining  affordances),  since  the 
framework of complementarity is based both on the refusal of a unique fundamental point of 
observation  and  explanation  and  on  the  “recognition  of  the  multiplicity  of  places  of 
observations  and  explanations”.
38  So, the question is to describe not only a model of 
communication that sets the conditions of dialogue between different subjects and viewpoints 
but also a model of communication that sets the conditions of the recognition of new 
observers (i.e. subjects, interlocutors, or sub-systems of communication).  
 
III. Models of communication of political-public discourse 
If  understood  as  the  frame  of  political-public  discourse,  democracy  can  be  represented 
through  two  models  of  communication:  i.e.  the  model  of  “dialogue”  and  the  model  of 
“claim”.  According  to  the  principle  of  complementarity,  these  models  can  characterize 
different stages of democracy but can also coexist within the same stage of democracy; they 
can characterize different outlets of communication (traditional or electronic) but can also 
coexist in the interplay between traditional and electronic media, as we will point out later in 
the paper. These two models differ from one another with regard to: (a) the relation between 
political actors and communication; and (b) the aim of communication itself.  
 
1. The model of dialogue 
The  model  of  dialogue  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  interlocutors  precede  the 
communication and they structure it through their communicative interaction. In a sense, it is 
possible to affirm that they precede “the word” and they constitute it as the horizon of their 
                                                           
38 Ceruti (note 21) at 120.  
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intersubjective agreement. Non-metaphorically speaking, this means that interlocutors, i.e. the 
political  actors,  interact  communicatively  on  the  basis  of  a  political  subjectivity  already 
formed and recognized, which is thus fully developed in communication. 
According to this model, the aim of communication is to provide foundation, through 
confrontation of opinions, refinement of arguments and subjection to criticism, to a rational 
agreement and thus to political consensus. Such a form of consensus legitimizes the decisions 
that guide political action. In other words, through the public use of reason, democracy is 
provided, in the sphere of reflexivity, an epistemic foundation: public opinion is not only a 
matter of “opinions and beliefs” but, more and more, a question concerning the conceptual 
matrix and the informational foundation of such opinions and beliefs. The fact that democracy 
has an epistemic foundation seems to be a key achievement of political thought for a deeper 
understanding of the complex networked society of information. And this is true even if, 
according  to  a  mature  theory  of  information
39, the question of information is not totally 
coextensive with the question of truth.  
In fact, on the one hand, the content of a false statement can be more informative than the 
content of a true statement, since the former may be pragmatically less distant from truth than 
the latter
40 (consider the following case: there are eight people in a room. The sentence “there 
are seven people in the room” is false. The sentence “there are some people in the room” is 
true. The former is more informative than the latter since it is less distant from truth).  
On the other, the overload of information has made lying  useless in the information 
society, since framing and selection of information are more viable ways to misrepresent 
reality  than  disinformation  and  misinformation.
41  Consider the case of homicides for the 
construction  of  “social  alarm”:  homicides  accomplished  by  acquaintances  (i.e.  friends, 
relatives, lovers, etc.) are more numerous than homicides accomplished by strangers but they 
are framed and represented as “private events”, whereas homicides accomplished by strangers 
are  framed  and  represented  as  “social  events”.  However,  to  state  that  strangers  have 
accomplished a high number of homicides or crimes in relation to the number of strangers 
(present in Italy) is not false. In other words, we have enough instances and information to 
construct both the homicides by acquaintances and the homicides by strangers as factors of 
social alarm: what type of social alarm we represent is a matter of political decision, even if 
such a representation is often conducted, strictly speaking, within the perimeter of truth. The 
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potential truth-tracking attitude of information should be analyzed from a wider cognitive 
perspective.  
The more the complex networked society uses ICTs and politics turns into an articulated 
form of management and control over the life-cycle of information, the more political power 
will be based on that sum of information (beliefs and opinions) capable of generating a certain 
level of trust and thus of consensus (trust being a sort of precondition for consensus). In this 
sense, the political power will be legitimized by an epistemic trust (i.e. trust that reality is as it 
appears  in  the  public  sphere)  that  constitutes  the  general  frame  within  which  both  the 
relational trust (i.e. trust into political actors) and the systemic trust (i.e. trust in the political 
system as a whole) are attributed. 
In the perspective of the model of dialogue, an aspect deserves special attention, since it 
often causes a recurrent misunderstanding. According to this model, interlocutors are already 
defined  in  their  political  subjectivity:  they  are  political  actors  recognized  in  the  system 
(politicians, experts, professional journalists, intellectuals, etc.) and therefore they enjoy a 
certain  level  of  trust  in  the  formation  of  the  public  opinion,  that  is  to  say,  salience  and 
credibility in informational terms. In other words, they are recognized as capable to produce 
and/or select politically relevant and reliable information. However, this implies that, at closer 
examination,  their  communicative  interaction  cannot  be  rigorously  defined  as  an 
intersubjective  relation  if,  by  intersubjective  relation,  we  do  not  refer  tautologically  to  a 
relation between (already constituted) subjects. An intersubjective relation is, in our opinion, 
more correctly understood and defined as the relation that is constitutive of subjectivity. In the 
case  considered  here,  the  communicative  relation  between  political  subjectivities  already 
structured in their prerogatives should be, therefore, defined as an (epistemic) “interobjective 
relation”, namely,  as  a  relation  that is  meant  to  constitute  or give shape to  the objective 
conditions of the political-public discourse (i.e. the conditions making that discourse a shared 
and rational discourse).  
In this perspective, it is necessary to clarify what are the objective conditions aimed to 
assure democratic communication. Furthermore, such conditions are not to be intended in our 
model  only  with  regards  to  the  “paradigm  of  communication”  but  first  and  foremost  in 
relation  to  the  “paradigm  of  information”
42.  The  interobjective  relation  has,  therefore,  to 
accomplish the following objective conditions: 
 
                                                           
42 For a comparison between those two notions of paradigm see Ugo Pagallo, Teoria giuridica della complessità, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2006.  
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1) the integration in the system of communication of a plurality of informational channels 
(as to the logic of production and selection of information); 
2) the formation of the basis of accessible information; 
3) the formation of public opinion on the basis of produced and selected information; 
4) the critical confrontation between public opinions and arguments. 
 
These four basic conditions  define the life-cycle of political-public information  (which is 
described here in relation to communication in democratic societies but could be described 
also, more generally, in the terms of the theory of information laid down by Luciano Floridi
43: 
creation, elaboration, distribution, storage, protection, usage and possible destructio n  of 
information). In the complex networked society of information, the life -cycle of information 
is the  space where political conflict for the acquisition and legitimization of power takes 
place. These conditions that frame political-public discourse are susceptible to be redesigned 
by the evolution of ICTs and the emergence of a networked public sphere
44. We will focus our 
attention on this crucial point later on in the paper; for the moment, we have to deal with two 
common criticisms that are made against  the hypothesis itself of an emerging networked 
public sphere.  
Firstly, it is often stated that networked communication is unable to produce relevant and 
reliable information: this criticism concerns the quality of information. This criticism has 
been  rebutted  empirically,  by  reference  to  several  examples
45  showing  that  networked 
communication (including online journalism) has been capable to produce relevant and 
reliable political information (that has given rise to political consequences in real life). Th e 
diverse “quality” of networked information has to be traced back to the diverse conceptual 
matrix that govern online communication. In the previous paragraph, we have discussed this 
point from an epistemological perspective, by stating that the epistemological principle that 
governs networked communication should be intended as a principle of complementarity
46 
that  is  consistent  with  the  interpretation  of  informational  resources  and  networking 
technologies as constraining affordances.  
Secondly, it is also often stated that networked communication does not give rise to real 
intersubjective interactions based on face-to-face relations as in real life. This criticism (which 
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44 Benkler (note 1) and Castells (note 15).  
45 See again Benkler (note 1) and Castells (note 15). 
46 Ceruti (note 21).   
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has also been referred to traditional media) can be briefly discussed here and it can be refuted 
in two ways.  
The  first  one  consists  in  saying  that  there  are  online  intersubjective  interactions  – 
regardless  to  the  strict  requirement  of  face-to-face  relations  –  which  are  not  displayed 
according to the model of dialogue but according to the model of claim, as we will see in a 
moment.  
The second one is even more incisive and it is based on what we have already remarked: 
the  communicative  interaction  displayed  (offline  or  online)  according  to  the  model  of 
dialogue does not give rise to an intersubjective but to an “interobjective” relation, aimed to 
accomplish the epistemic objective conditions at which the political-public discourse may be 
perceived as shared and rationale discourse. In this perspective, online communication does 
not differ from offline communication based on the model of dialogue. Time has come to turn 
our attention to the second communicative model: that of claim.    
 
2. The model of claim 
The model of claim is characterized by the fact that “the word” precedes the interlocutors and 
establishes the communication. The discourse does not primarily carry a message but a claim: 
it requests the attention of the interlocutor. Through the discourse, each interlocutor is invited 
to acknowledge the other in her subjectivity. The word – the order of discourse – does not 
constitute here the space where the interobjective relation takes place but the way through 
which the process of political subjectivation may start. According to the model of claim, 
interlocutors  are  not  pre-constituted  in  their  (political)  subjectivity;  on  the  contrary,  they 
constitute it through their communicative interaction.          
Whether in the model of dialogue the accent is placed on the idea of communication (as 
the horizon of the interobjective relation), in the model of claim the emphasis is on the idea of 
attention (as the horizon of the intersubjective relation). This consideration is backed by the 
evolution of ICTs and of the complex networked society of information: where information is 
scarce,  communication  is  fundamental  as  a  way  of  sharing  information;  where  we  face 
information overload, attention becomes crucial
47 as a way of selecting relevant and reliable 
information. What is brought to attention is not so much the topic of discussion but the 
request of recognition (which entails the process of subjectivation). In that case, the question 
is not to define the obje ctive but the subjective conditions of communication: that is, the 
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extent of the concept of political interlocutor (i.e. the range of participants, in the networked 
public sphere, in the formation of political-public discourse).       
According  to  the  model  of  claim,  the  aim  of  communication  is  the  process  of 
subjectivation that defines the perimeter of those enabled to assert their claims (interests, 
desires, expectations, requests, etc.) as a political instance or a critical judgement addressed to 
the political regime. This model does not belong only to the achieved democracies but, first 
and  foremost,  to  the  developing  or  potential  democracies.  An  appealing  example  can  be 
drawn by the recent “wave of upheavals in the Mediterranean countries”, which is explicitly 
concerned with the use of ICTs in the formation of public opinion.       
In order to  illustrate such an example, we will refer to  what  has  been stated by the 
European  Commission:  “The  use  of  electronic  communications  technologies  –  on  top  of 
satellite  broadcasting  –  greatly  facilitated  the  wave  of  upheavals  in  the  Mediterranean 
countries. The widespread use of mobile phones combined with social networking via internet 
showed the importance of information society tools and technologies to the circulation of 
information. In countries where the circulation of information is partially restricted such tools 
can greatly contribute to the democratization of societies and the creation of public opinion 
through the promotion of freedom of expression”
48. In line with this reasoning, the European 
Commission  has  also  significantly  stated:  “Moreover,  ensuring  the  security,  stability  and 
resilience of the Internet and of other electronic communication technologies is a fundamental 
building  block  in  democracy.  It  is  necessary  to  avoid  arbitrarily  depriving  or  disrupting 
citizen’s  access  to  them.  Given  the  trans-border  and  interconnected  nature  of  electronic 
communications technologies, including the Internet, any unilateral domestic intervention can 
have severe effects on other parts of the world. The Commission will develop tools to allow 
the EU, in appropriate cases, to assist civil society organizations or individual citizens to 
circumvent such arbitrary disruptions”
49.  
Three  aspects  of the European Commission’s communication are here  to  be stressed 
(which appear to be in line with what we have argued so far):  
 
1)  The European Commission recognizes and underlines the need to ensure the security, 
stability and resilience no longer of traditional political institutions but of the Internet and 
                                                           
48 EC Communication, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, 
Joint communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels (8.3.2011), COM. 200 final, 2011, 10.  
49 EC Communication (note 48) at 11.   
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of  other  electronic  communication  technologies  as  a  “fundamental  building  block  of 
democracy”;  
 
2)  The  European  Commission  overtly  acknowledges  civil  society  organizations  and 
individual  citizens  as  crucial  “political  actors”  in  the  upheavals  of  Mediterranean 
countries:  in  this  case,  the  recognition  of  political  subjectivity  stems  from  the 
technological capability of networked communication users to link individual desires, 
represent political expectations and claim public attention;  
 
3) Networked communication enables both “the creation of public opinion through the 
promotion of freedom of expression” and a likewise crucial practice of “concentration of 
attention”
50 over selected political issues and claims: this means, according to our model, 
that the creation of public opinion and the shared request of public attention, enabled and 
fostered by the Internet and the other communication technologies, not only brings into 
the general notice what is politically relevant (from an informational point of view) but, 
more importantly, also entails a process of political subjectivation that enlarges the class 
of those who are recognized as sources of relevant political information. 
 
This case shows that the model of dialogue does not suffice by itself to explain how the public 
sphere  is  structured  in  the  e-democratic  frame  of  the  complex  networked  society  of 
information. The model of claim is a necessary integration of the communicative model of 
dialogue,  and  it  will  enable  us  to  better  account  for  the  way  ICTs  might  redesign  the 
subjective and objective conditions of political-public discourse.      
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3. The subjective and objective conditions of political-public discourse 
As observed from the start, the first and most significant way ICTs evolution has an impact 
over the subjective and objective conditions of political-public discourse is by redesigning the 
networked space of information in digital terms.  
The networked digital space of information is, from a philosophical point of view, ideal 
and relative. Ideal in the sense of Kant’s notion of space and relative in the sense of Leibniz’s 
notions of space
51. Let me briefly explain these references. It is ideal, in Kantian te rms, since 
it does not exist independently from the human mind, since the meaning of informational 
objects is not independent from the human mind (i.e. from the knower [the subject of 
knowledge] that is here the informee [the subject of information], accor ding  to  Floridi’s 
theory of semantic information
52). It is relative, in the sense of Leibniz, since it does not exist 
independently of the informational objects. This means that space cannot be thought of 
independently  from  the  properties  and  relations  of  i nformational  objects  (namely, 
independently from the relations of differences that are constitutive of data
53). From an 
epistemic  point  of  view,  informational  object  are  resources  conceived  as  “constraining 
affordances”
54. This amounts to saying that the relativity of the networked digital space of 
information is conceivable as the ensemble of the properties and the relations between the 
informational objects, that is to say, as the tension between the constraints and the affordances 
of the informational resources.  
This requires us to precise what the properties of bits and the relations of informational 
objects redesigning the networked digital space of information are. We will just consider, 
here, their main characteristics. According to Danah Boyd
55, the constraining affordances of 
online communication based on the properties of bits are the following: 
 
1)  Persistence: online expressions are automatically recorded and archived. 
2)  Replicability: content made out of bits can be duplicated. 
3)  Scalability: the potential visibility of content in networked outlets is great. 
4)  Searchability: content in networked outlets can accessed through search. 
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According to Jannis Kallinikos
56, we could add the following characteristics: 
 
5)  De-contextuability:  content  made  out  of  bits  can  be  de-contextualized  and 
granted new meaning. 
6)  Recombinability: content can be easily recombined through networked outlets 
to form new computational objects.     
 
According  to  Luciano  Floridi
57, the space of info rmation (that includes both the 
analogue and the digital space) owns the following characteristics: 
 
7)  Contraction:  the  acceleration  of  every  interaction  (notably  of  informational 
fluxes)  has  contracted  the  physical  space  where  we  are  engaged  to  make 
decisions, to act and interact.   
8)  Expansion: ICTs have expanded the virtual networked space where we can e-
live.  
9)  Porosity: ICTs have increased (quantitatively) the communication between the 
analogue and the digital space.   
10)   Hybridization: ICTs re-ontologize (qualitatively) the space we live in since 
they progressively remove the idea of computer as an “interface” between the 
analogue and the digital reality in favor of a unique space of information (i.e. 
infosphere). 
11)   Synchronization:  the  widespread  integration  and  concatenation  of 
informational fluxes determine more and more the contingent (i.e. complex) 
synchronization of practices and tendencies that otherwise would be chaotic 
and unrelated.     
12)   Correlation: the networked dimension of informational relations is so much 
interconnected  that  each  informational  object  that  “falls  in  the  net”  is 
susceptible  to  propagate  its  waves  across  the  net  outside  the  distinction 
between local and remote.     
 
If  we  consider  the  aforementioned  structural  constraining  affordances  of  the  information 
space along with the architectural
58 and economic
59 constraining affordances of the net, we 
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may better understand how ICTs have redesigned the subjective and objective conditions of 
networked political-public discourse. Hereafter we resume the main consequences of ICTs’ 
evolution for the formation of online public opinion (according to the interplay between the 
two  communicative  models  of  dialogue  and  claim)  from  the  two  points  of  view  of 
informational inputs and outputs that concern both the subjective and the objective conditions 
of the public-political discourse: 
 
1)  Informational inputs:  
 
1.1.  A wider class of interlocutors (i.e. political actors) are enclosed among those 
who can produce and selected the relevant and reliable political information: 
this entails a greater pluralism of informational sources [subjective condition]; 
1.2.  A wider class of informational objects  (i.e. news, opinions,  beliefs, etc.) is 
gathered and enclosed among what counts as a relevant and reliable political 
information,  produced  independently  from  the  commercial  and  proprietary 
logic and organization of traditional media: this entails a greater pluralism of 
informational resources [objective condition]; 
1.3.  A  wider  class  of  informational  claims  (i.e.  interests,  expectations,  desires, 
requests,  etc.)  is  produced  online  as  a  result  of  the  contraction,  expansion, 
porosity,  hybridization,  correlation  and  synchronization  of  the  information 
space [subjective condition].  
1.4.  A  wider  class  of  informational  relations  (i.e.  informational  flows)  is  made 
possible  online  as  a  result  of  the  replicability,  scalability,  scalability, 
searchability, recombinability and de-contextuability of content made out of 
bits [objective condition].  
 
2)  Informational outputs:  
 
2.1.  A wider class of interlocutors (i.e. political actors) are enclosed among those 
who can “check” the facts and the opinions produced both online and offline: 
extension of public power of control and criticism [subjective condition]; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Its Inventor, Orion Business, Britain, 1999. 
59 Benkler (note 1).   
21 
2.2.  A wider class of interlocutors can bring into the “general notice” the facts and 
the opinions produced both online and offline: extension of the sphere of public 
accountability [subjective condition]; 
2.3.  Attenuation of the balkanization of opinion (i.e. the effect of “the room of 
echo”) as a result of the de-contextuability and recombinability of the content 
made out of bits [objective condition]; 
2.4.  Increase of the “gestalt switch” in the formation of public opinions as a result 
of the enlargement of the basis of information available and accessible made 
possible by the replicability, scalability and searchability of content made out 
of bits [objective condition]. 
 
We have focused our analysis on the epistemic constraining affordances that enable, in our 
opinion, the emergence of a real and relevant sphere of networked public opinion. Of course, 
these epistemic conditions are also backed by the architectural and economic constraining 
affordances of the net
60.  
Time has come to consider more closely a relevant phenomenon for democracy that 
seems to delineate the traditional media from the networked outlet s of communication and 
concentration of attention: the phenomenon of virtualization of consensus.     
 
IV. The phenomenon of virtualization of consensus 
Some scholars have remarked that democracy is both a word and a thing
61. In a sense, the 
“word democracy” is, nowadays, irrefutable and uncontested: nobody would realistically and 
successfully try to achieve the sovereign power or to legitimate their political action, while 
asserting to do so in a non democratic way or that such action could be performed outside a 
democratic framework. For anyone who wants to obtain sovereign power and to legitimate a 
political project, the reference to democracy seems to be obliged. Nevertheless, the “thing 
democracy” is still far from being pacifically and unquestionably envisaged and established. 
The word democracy is full of promises and always accompanied by principles, rights and 
values, whereas the thing democracy is still plenty of disillusions, shadows and troubles that 
oblige us to constantly watch over its “healthiness”: i.e. its effectiveness or substance. 
The landscape and life of democracy are thus always unquiet, shaken and perturbed, and 
this is all the more true as different political regimes are confronting each other in the current 
process of globalization. Today, in our globalised world, the quest for democracy proceeds at 
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different  pace  and  is  subject  to  a  peculiar  contradiction.  On  the  one  hand,  democracy  is 
potentially subjected to derives: we are said to have moved from a representative democracy 
to an electoral democracy; from an electoral democracy to a plebiscitarian democracy; from a 
plebiscitarian  democracy  to  a  democracy  founded  on  media  power
62.  On  the  other, 
“democracy”  is  passionately  sought  after  as  it  has  been  showed  by  the  above-mentioned 
political wave of upheavals in the Mediterranean countries, where the networked circulation 
of information has contributed “to the democratization of societies and the creation of public 
opinion through the promotion of freedom of expression”, as remarked with maybe too much 
emphasis by the EC.  
Let us take the first case concerning western societies: that of democracy founded on 
traditional media power. In this case, the spaces of participation and of deliberation have been 
reduced: information and consensus have become the poles of attraction of democracy, and 
the construction of meaning, as already remarked, has become the way political power is 
obtained  and  legitimized.  Against  this  backdrop,  we  have  to  remark  a  paradoxical 
phenomenon: traditional media have fostered in real life a phenomenon of virtualization of 
consensus, which has been contrasted in the virtual reality by means of the communication 
displayed through the electronic media. In a previous essay consecrated to the relevance of 
fear in the construction of political-public discourse
63, I have analyzed this phenomenon in 
full details that I would like to sum up briefly.  
The argument is the following: “fear” has become the most recurrent and important topic 
of  political-public  discourse  constructed  by  traditional  media.  More  than  this,  it  has  also 
become the general frame through which the whole political reality is represented, interpreted 
and given meaning. This fabrication of meaning plays a crucial role: through the reference to 
what we fear, political-public discourse represents what we want to protect. In this way, the 
map of our interests, expectations, common goods, and desires, which are no longer made 
subject of our explicit claims, is publicly traced. In this sense, we are supposed to express 
consensus to the politics that are concerned with the promised protection of what is meant to 
be the content of “our own fears”, which are fabricated by the political-public discourse. The 
fabricated fears become the information (i.e. the input) that the political system processes in 
order to produce consensus (i.e. the output).  
In this perspective, consensus becomes virtual: this means that consensus is no longer 
directly manifested in relation to possible political choices but it is indirectly manifested in 
relation  to  what  is  assumed  to  be  at  risk  in  society.  The  manifestation  of  consensus  is 
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substituted or, to be more precise, is prepared by the representation of what we fear to lose. 
The  political-public  discourse  elaborated  by  means  of  traditional  media  tends  to  treat 
audiences as a permanently “sick social body” in two senses: firstly, in the sense that the 
social body is not confronted with how to improve its wellness but with how to protect itself 
from further sufferings, diseases and losses (i.e. the virtual evil); secondly, that sickness is not 
measured in relation to an empirical body but in relation to a statistical construction of the 
social  body  (i.e.  the  virtual  body).  This  gives  rise  to  a  crucial  political  phenomenon  of 
“virtualization  of  consensus”,  which  is  manifested  by  a  virtual  social  body  in  relation  to 
virtual evils. This process of virtualization goes to the point that the place of the legitimization 
and the justification of political power becomes “virtual”: consensus is no longer manifested 
but inferred by what is represented as socially perceived risk
64.   
In this sense, through the fabrication of fears and risks elaborated by traditional media, 
real life public opinion in may be said to appear, , more “virtual” than the networked public 
opinion  in  the  virtual  reality.  On  the  contrary,  as  we  have  remarked  by  quoting  the  EC 
communication, the creation of online public opinion can produce and display consequences 
that are appreciated in real life: not only in terms of freedom of expression but also in terms of 
political subjectivation, according to the model of claim. 
Let us briefly come back to this example, in order to explain one of the salient aspects of 
the social and political impact of ICTs on democracy. The following consideration is also 
intended to clarify in what sense technology gives shape to the environment we are engaged 
in throughout the establishing of constraining affordances.  
Technology  creates  new  possibilities:  these  possibilities  can  be  understood  as 
affordances
65. People are enabled by new technologies to do what they could not do before: 
this does not guarantee for sure that they will do it. As suggested by Benkler
66, technology 
makes it easier (or more difficult) to perform some actions and have some human interactions. 
Ceteris paribus, Benkler says, the easiest things to do are more likely to be done, whilst the 
most  difficult  ones  are  less  likely  to  be  done.  However,  other  variables  never  remain 
constant. This is the reason why strict technological determinism – according to which, if 
provided with a technology t, we can expect the emergence of the social relation or structure s 
– is false
67.  
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Let us reformulate this argument from another point of view by introducing the idea of 
power. As said, technology provides us with new possibilities. However, not all of them are 
implemented and imbedded in society. When this occurs, that is, when technologies become 
part of our activities, such possibilities may turn into powers that users avail themselves of. 
Technology not only creates new possibilities: it creates new powers. In this sense, the (social 
and political) impact of technology consists in what its implementation alters the distribution 
of powers that exist in a democracy. This is the reason why, most of the times, political-public 
discourse directed against, or in favor of, a given technology is, in reality, concerned and 
troubled with the redistribution of powers that such technology has enabled
68.  
Therefore, the implementation, development and social acceptance of a technology is not 
only politically guided by the representation of determined ends to pursue or needs to meet. 
They are also explained and backed by the existing competitions between int erests and 
powers that run across and affect a society. In its turn, the endorsed technology is able to spur 
new competitions or even conflicts as a result of the rearrangement of powers it enables. For 
that reason, the issue at stake is not so much what s ocial structure a new technology 
determines; it is rather who are the  social groups or individuals that such a technology has 
been able to empower. Furthermore, such empowerment is notably related to the structure of 
desires that characterizes a social group or individuals.  
Desire  is  crucial  to  politics  since  it  is  the  measure  of  our  perceived  inequalities. 
According to the theory of mimetic desire
69, our desires do not stem from scratch: we do not 
simply desire to be this or that or to have this or that. On the contrary, we desire what others 
own: in this sense, our desires are the expression of the inequalities that exist in a society 
among  persons  that  perceive  each  other  as  similar  (i.e.  comparable).  Hence,  to  be  more 
precise, we desire to have what the others similar to us own.   
This  means  that  social  groups  or  individuals  are  likely  to  harness  the  technological 
affordances that enable them to meet their desires and thus to reduce the inequalities that exist 
within  a  society  or  between  societies:  in  this  sense,  technological  evolution  may  have  a 
democratizing effect in society, if equality is meant to be the virtue of democracy
70. This has 
been the case in the wave of upheavals in the Mediterranean countries, where “electronic 
communication technologies” did not only enable people to communicate, to form public 
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opinion and to express their freedom; they also enabled people to perceive themselves, at the 
same time, as similar to western digital natives by making use of ICTs, and different to them 
as regards to the development and granting of democracy in their societies. In this sense, 
electronic  communication  technologies  have  been  decisive  to  make  people  (and  youth  in 
particular) to desire to have what other people similar to them already enjoy.        
Needless  to  say  that  a  technology  could  be  endorsed  and  implemented  for  the  very 
opposite reason, that is, in order to deepen the inequalities that exist between individuals, 
social groups or even societies at large. In that case, it is harder to speak of a democratizing 
effect  of  technology,  which  however  can  turn  into  an  economic,  political  or  social 
improvement of some individuals, social groups or societies. In sum, as far as technological 
possibilities are implemented and transformed into power, technology is able to lessen or 
deepen  the  inequalities  existing  in  a  society  or  between  them.  In  this  sense,  once  again, 
technological  affordances  do  not  dictate  people’s  behaviors,  but  they  do  configure  the 
environment  in  a  way  that  shapes  their  engagement  in  lessening  or  deepening  existing 
inequalities.  
In the next and last paragraph, we will stress this basic idea from the epistemological 
standpoint we have started with: e-democracy as the frame of the networked public discourse, 
that is, how electronic communication technologies give shape to the whole informational 
environment (which in the long term will erase the distinction between analogue and digital 
space) in the epistemic terms of constraints and affordances. As already remarked, democracy 
as  well  as  e-democracy  have  an  epistemic  foundation,  whose  epistemology  should  be 
understood according to a principle of complementarity
71.      
 
V. The integrated public sphere: complementarity between traditional and electronic 
media 
In  a  world  based  on  a  realistic,  traditional  ontology  (where  our  beliefs  and  opinions  are 
ultimately based on the existence of material objects) traditional media used to play the role 
of instruments of information, disinformation and misinformation, which all presuppose a 
confrontation between the content of information and the world. In a world ever more based 
on  a  digital,  virtual  ontology  (where  our  beliefs  and  opinions  are  mainly  based  on  the 
consistence of information: we do assist to a certain liquefaction of the world, in favor of 
biographies, that are the privileged subject of media narration), traditional media tend to play 
the role of instruments of pressure and concentration of attention.   
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This  tendency is  backed by the  role of electronic media to  such an extent that they 
cooperate in the virtual rendition of the world. However, it is also contrasted by electronic 
media to such an extent that their conceptual matrix (the set of their constraining affordances) 
differs  from  that  of  traditional  media:  this  has  entailed,  as  already  pointed  out,  both  an 
extension of what counts as relevant political information and an extension of the class of 
those  who  count  as  political  interlocutors  (individuals,  bloggers,  online  journalists, 
wikileakers, etc.). 
We are thus confronted with a multi-system construction of the networked public sphere, 
where actors tend to be respondent and accountable for the formation of public opinion within 
the  limits  set  by  the  constraining  affordances  characterizing  the  conceptual  matrix  of  the 
information space and the model of communication they belong to. It is important to remind 
that the protection of free press and, more generally, of public opinion formation is correlative 
firstly to public interest and secondly to responsibility.  
It  is  apparent  that  professional  journalists  are  sensitive  to  public  interest  and 
responsibility in a way that is different from that of online journalists. This difference, as we 
have tried to argue so far, does not only depend on the organizational structure to which 
(either professional or online) journalists belong but also on the constraining affordances of 
the conceptual matrix to which they are respondent. Furthermore, we have also to mention 
that diverse outlets of communication (traditional or electronic) are exposed in a different way 
and to a different extent to political attacks or pressures, to social or economical conditionings 
(which  are  often  unreviewable  by  a  Court,  since  brought  about  by  actors  who  are  not 
themselves subject to constitutional constraints
72): new media seem to be more vulnerable to 
attacks, than traditional media, to the extent to which they are subject to the action of an 
extralegal public-private partnership that challenges the robustness and resilience of the 
networked information space. Hence, new media have to be protected by including them more 
and more within the e -democratic frame of the (legitimated) formation of political -public 
discourse.   
In  this  perspective,  which  has  to  be  understood  according  to  the  principle  of 
complementarity, it is sys tematically  in  society’s  interest  to  protect  “the  integrity  of  the 
newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the public”
73. This 
systemic interest grows out of the recognition that the public sphere is now constructed by an 
assorted set of actors and requires us to recognize that e-democracy needs “multiple layers of 
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checks and balances”
74 and “a new model of cooperation”
75 between traditional and electronic 
media.  A  mutual  interaction  between  different  types  of  media  (that  is,  between  different 
observer’s viewpoints) can make us to better understand how different viewpoints produce 
themselves reciprocally and it can make different types of media to better deal with the limits 
(constraints) and the opportunities (affordances) of their conceptual matrix.  
In this perspective, Yochai Benkler, dealing with the question of Wikileaks
76, seems to 
endorse the epistemic idea of complementarity as a guidance principle for elaborating a model 
of partnership (that encompasses cooperation, concurrence and also antagonism) between 
traditional and electronic media. According to Benkler, on the one hand, traditional media, 
that are at present increasingly challenged in their identity and role, can harness electronic 
outlets of communication: (a) by integrating distributed informational inputs in their own 
model;  (b)  by  extending  their  platform  through  the  use  of  networked  channels  of 
communication. On the other hand, electronic media, which are at present increasingly 
confronted with the issue of the quality of information (i.e. relevance and reliability) and of 
the responsibility for public disclosure, can harness traditional media, in order:  (a) to better 
ensure responsible disclosure and private confidentiality; (b) to better achieve salience and 
attention from the networked publics
77.                  
In conclusion, a principle of complementarity should be endorsed as the epistemological 
foundation of e-democracy conceived as the frame of the political -public discourse, if we 
really want to avoid the crucial risk that Yochai Benkler well summarizes as follows: 
 
The risk is that the government will support its preferred media models, and that the incumbent mass 
media players will, in turn, vilify and denigrate the newer models in ways that make them more 
vulnerable to attack and shore up the privileged position of those incumbents in their role as a more 
reliable ally-watchdog. This threat is particularly worrisome because it comes as the economics of 
incumbent media force us to look for new and creative networked structures to fill the vacuum left by 
the industrial decline of midtwentieth century media models.
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